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three-part proposal to combat age discrimination in the face of platform
authoritarianism. These proposals include: 1) reinforcement of the disparate
impact cause of action for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) via codification; 2) education for employers regarding the use of
ageist language in job ads; and 3) new EEOC guidelines for criteria
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hiring platforms.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the comedian Bill Maher proclaimed that “ageism is the last
acceptable prejudice in America.”1 While this sentiment has not been
affirmed by the research of several legal scholars, age discrimination in
employment has been an important preoccupation of legal scholarship.2 In

1. Greg Gilman, Bill Maher Rips ‘Shallow’ American Culture for Allowing ‘Ageism’ to Impact
Politics, THE WRAP (Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.thewrap.com/bill-maher-rips-shallow-american-culturefor-allowing-ageism-to-impact-politics/ [https://perma.cc/U4M3-YHC6]; see also Nicole Karlis, Time to
rethink how we talk about older people, SALON (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/03/31/timeto-rethink-how-we-talk-about-the-elderly/ (in which Dr. Bill Thomas, author of What are Old People
For?, observes that “Aging is the last form of bigotry you can speak of in public.”).
2. A survey of legal scholarship on age discrimination did not characterize it as an acceptable
social prejudice, however, several law review articles address the problem of age discrimination in
employment. See, for example, Laurie A. McCann, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at 50:
When Will It Become A “Real” Civil Rights Statute?, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 89, 94-95 (2017); Pnina
Alon-Shenker, Legal Barriers to Age Discrimination in Hiring Complaints, 39 DALHOUSIE L.J. 289, 313
(2016); Debra Lyn Bassett, Silencing Our Elders, 15 NEV. L.J. 519, 527 (2015); Michael
Harper, Reforming the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Proposals and Prospects, 16 EM. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 13 (2012); Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 217 (2007); Aida Marie Alaka, Corporate Reorganizations, Job Layoffs, and Age Discrimination:
Has Smith v. City of Jackson Substantially Expanded the Rights of Older Workers Under the ADEA?, 70
ALB. L. REV. 143 (2006); Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact under the Age Discrimination in
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the same year as Maher’s assertion, there were reports of Silicon Valley tech
workers (some in their mid-twenties) resorting to plastic surgery to maintain
what they perceived as the mandatory youthful appearance for job retention.3
Moreover, a 2018 ProPublica investigation uncovered that IBM may have
engaged in systematic and internally orchestrated age discrimination by
laying off a large number of older U.S. employees.4 According to
ProPublica’s estimates, “IBM has eliminated more than 20,000 American
employees ages 40 and over, about 60 percent of its estimated total U.S. job
cuts” in the last five years.5
The perception that youth is a requisite for employment in Silicon Valley
is confirmed by statements from industry leaders. For example, in 2007,
Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, told an audience at Stanford
University, “I want to stress the importance of being young and technical.”6
Zuckerberg added: “Young people are just smarter.”7 If such casual ageism
pervades Silicon Valley culture, then consider how these ageist perceptions
might influence hiring practices, especially as evinced by job advertisement,
recruitment, and job postings on hiring platforms.
Despite the five decades since the passage of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”)8 – a law meant to protect older workers in the
labor market – age discrimination in employment has not abated in recent
years.9 The law was passed in recognition of the social phenomenon of age
Employment Act of 1967, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1(2004); Judith D. Fischer, Public Policy and
the Tyranny of the Bottom Line in the Termination of Older Workers, 53 S.C. L. REV. 211 (2002).
3. Noam Scheiber, The Brutal Ageism of Tech, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/117088/silicons-valleys-brutal-ageism.
4. Peter Gosselin & Ariana Tobin, Cutting ‘Old Heads’ at IBM, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://features.propublica.org/ibm/ibm-age-discrimination-american-workers/ (“The company reacted
with a strategy that, in the words of one confidential planning document, would ‘correct seniority mix.’”)
5. Id.
6. Andrew Ross, In Silicon Valley, age can be a curse, SF GATE (Aug. 20, 2013),
https://www.sfgate.com/business/bottomline/article/In-Silicon-Valley-age-can-be-a-curse-4742365.php.
7. Id.
8. On December 15, 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) to prohibit and eradicate systemic age discrimination that older workers faced in the workplace.
See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.
9. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT
ACT
(CHARGES
FILED
WITH
EEOC)
(2017),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/adea.cfm [hereinafter EEOC, CHARGES FILED]
(showing no significant decrease in discrimination claims each year between 1997-2017). “Age
discrimination claims are on the rise in both volume of cases filed and size of verdicts. Given the current
economic landscape, widespread layoff announcements, and the aging boomer generation, that trend
seems unlikely to abate anytime soon.” Carla J. Rozycki & Patricia A. Bronte, A Game of Numbers: ADEA
Compliance and Litigation, 1 LAB. LAW. 18, 203 (2002). See also, Jana E. Cuellar, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Handling the Element of Intent in Summary Judgment Motions, 38
EMORY L. J. 523, 524 (1989); Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty:
Where It’s Been, Where It Is Today, Where It’s Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 591-96 (1997); Anne Noel
Occhialino & Daniel Vail, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 Symposium:
Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 682-83, 687 (2005)
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discrimination in hiring, wherein arbitrary age limits for job applicants lead
to greater unemployment rates for older workers.10 Thus, the ADEA offers
labor market protections for workers over forty years of age.11 The ADEA
prohibits employers and employment agencies from age discrimination in job
advertising, recruiting, hiring, and other employment opportunities.12 In
addition, the ADEA makes it unlawful to send or publish employment ads
that discriminate or indicate a preference or limitation based on age. 13 Yet,
statistics indicate that age discrimination is thriving in the digital age, with
20,857 age discrimination complaints filed with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in 2016 alone.14
Furthermore, there is the widespread suspicion that online job ads may
be excluding older workers. In a 2017 study from the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco,15 researchers created 40,000 fictitious resumes for job
applicants to uncover statistical evidence of age discrimination.16 Although
the ages of the applicants were not explicitly listed on the resumes, each
applicant’s age could be implicitly derived from the included high school
graduation year.17 The study revealed evidence of age bias among several
low-skilled jobs categories such as sales, administrators, and janitors. For
instance, for older male applicants, callbacks fell from 20.89 percent to 14.70
percent—indicating an almost 30 percent decrease in callback rate.18
However, older women applicants had an even more precipitous drop in
callbacks—a 47 percent lower callback rate for women in administrative jobs
and a 36 percent lower callback rate for women in sales jobs compared to
younger applicants—indicating the presence of even stronger intersectional
age and gender bias.19
In addition to audit studies that revealed the potential for platforms to
enable age bias, another recent study makes clear the connection between

10.

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621; 631(a)–(b) (2012). But note that some jurisdictions have passed laws to
include workers under age 40.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (b), (e) (2012).
13. Id.
14. See Austin O’Connor, Bias Toward Older Workers on the Rise as Age Discrimination Goes
Online,
THE
MILWAUKEE
INDEPENDENT
(Jan.
10,
2018),
http://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/syndicated/bias-toward-older-workers-on-the-rise-as-agediscrimination-goes-online/; see also EEOC, CHARGES FILED, supra note 9.
15. David Neumark, et. al., Age Discrimination and Hiring of Older Workers, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK
OF
SAN
FRANCISCO
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/publications/economic-letter/2017/february/age-discrimination-and-hiring-older-workers/.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
11.
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platforms and age discrimination in employment recruitment on platforms. 20
The investigative study by ProPublica and The New York Times concluded
that dozens of employers—among them Verizon, Amazon, Goldman Sachs,
Target, and Facebook—targeted applicants by age and excluded individuals
over 40,21 a forbidden action under the ADEA.22 Specifically, the ProPublica
investigation obtained a job advertisement database which revealed that
Facebook ads can be and are targeted to precise age groups, allowing
employers to recruit job applicants that are below a certain age.23 For
example, the obtained jobs ads show that in a search for “part-time package
handlers,” Facebook enabled the United Parcel Service to run an
advertisement that targeted only individuals between the ages of 18 to 24.24
Another job ad uncovered by ProPublica showed the insurance company
State Farm targeted only job applicants between 19 and 35.25
This age-targeted advertising is the subject of a recent class action
complaint filed against Facebook.26 That complaint lays out the causal link
between age discrimination and how job ads are advertised on social media
and job recruitment platforms. The complaint was filed on behalf of the
Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) against several companies,
including Amazon and T-Mobile, and a class of employers across the
country.27 The primary allegation is that the named companies and the
defendant class are shielding older workers from receiving job ads by
“specifically targeting their employment ads to younger workers via
Facebook’s ad platform.”28 The complaint alleges that Facebook’s
involvement in this practice “is not simply that of an intermediary that
operates a platform to develop, sell, and deliver ads to Facebook users.”29
Rather, “Facebook has used its own ad platform to recruit job applicants to
work at Facebook, and Facebook routinely used the same discriminatory age
filters to exclude older workers from seeing Facebook’s own employment
ads for a range of positions” in the company.30 This distinction, that
Facebook is not merely acting as a third-party provider, is important. Section

20. Julia Angwin, et. al., Facebook Job Ads Raise Concerns About Age Discrimination, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/business/facebook-job-ads.html.
21. Id.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (b), (e).
23. See Julia Angwin et al., supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. T-Mobile,
Inc., No. 17-cv-07232 (Dec. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9FHQ-UACR].
27. Id. at ¶ 1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at ¶ 22.
30. Id.
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230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)31 holds that ISPs (that is,
internet service providers) such as Facebook, cannot be held liable for usergenerated content where the provider did not create or develop the content at
issue. Following the same logic, some courts have ruled that when online
platforms are manipulating content they could be considered content
developers under the CDA and thus exempt from the liability protections of
Section 230.32
Platforms are generally understood as services that “process (meta)data
through algorithms and formatted protocols” before presenting the
interpreted information to third parties.33 While this definition of platforms is
expansive enough to include internet-enabled infrastructure for hiring and
management, the layperson’s conceptualization of platforms is largely
restricted to one genre: social media platforms. Most Americans are familiar
with, and regularly use, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter,
etc. And thus far, most legal scholarship on platforms have focused on
problems associated with social media.34 Increasingly, Americans are also
interacting with recruitment platforms such as LinkedIn. However, work
platforms have been largely exempt from the public discussion and
understanding of employment discrimination. Few researchers have studied
how these automated hiring platforms work in concert with social media to
cull or redline older job applicants via unlawful practices.
Part I of this Article details the design and use features through which
platforms might enable, facilitate, or contribute to age discrimination.
Notably, regarding the design features, I note how platforms use proxies both
to bar older job applicants from access to advertised jobs and also to glean
prohibited age information. In Part II, I observe how antidiscrimination law,
such as the ADEA, may be inadequate to curtail design features that enable

31.
32.

Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the cases.
JOSE VAN DIJCK, THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA

33.
29 (2013).
34. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017) (noting racial discrimination on
Airbnb platform); Alexander Tsesis, Symposium: Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 605 (2017) (discussing terrorist forums on social media platforms); Catherine
Tremble, Note, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social Networks’ Use of Machine-Learning
Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825 (2017) (discussing § 230 immunity and whether machine learning
algorithms fall under such protection); Brian Mund, Note, Social Media Searches and the Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 238 (2017) (discussing the reasonable expectation of
privacy on social media platforms); James Long, Note, #Fired: The National Labor Relations Act and
Employee Outbursts in the Age of Social Media, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1217 (2015) (noting ambiguity
surrounding employee posts as concerted activity); Shelby Sklar, Note, The Impact of Social Media on
the Legislative Process: How the Speech or Debate Clause Could be Interpreted, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC.
POL’Y 389 (2015) (discussing Speech and Debate Clause and the use of social media in the legislative
process); Amy J. St. Eve et al., #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 64 (2014) (discussing implications of social media use by jurors).
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platform age discrimination in employment. In Part III, I put forth a threepart proposal to combat age discrimination in the face of platform
authoritarianism. By platform authoritarianism, I refer to our present social
position vis-à-vis platforms, wherein creators of platforms demand that we
engage with those platforms solely “on their dictated terms, without regard
for established laws and business ethics.”35 My proposals for combating age
discrimination on online platforms include: 1) reinforcing the disparate
impact cause of action for the ADEA via codification; 2) educating
employers regarding the use of ageist language in job ads; and 3) applying
new EEOC guidelines regarding design and documentation requirements for
job advertisement, recruitment, and hiring platforms.
I. PLATFORM DESIGN & AGE DISCRIMINATION
Although hiring algorithms have been touted as an efficiency tool for a
now digitized workplace,36 there are some indications that the growing use of
platforms for recruitment and hiring is contributing to age discrimination.
Since 1999, the number of age discrimination charges filed with the EEOC
has risen by 47 percent.37 Given this increase in the number of claims, age
discrimination has been established as one of the most common forms of
employment discrimination.38 But why have claims of discrimination risen
so drastically over such a short period of time?
One explanation is that the average age of the working population has
been gradually rising. In fact, workers aged 65 and older make up the fastest

35. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Facebook Users Aren’t the Reason Facebook is in Trouble Now, WASH. POST,
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/03/23/facebook-usersarent-the-reason-facebook-is-in-trouble-now/ [https://perma.cc/576A-NBL8].
36. See, e.g., Vivian Giang, Why New Hiring Algorithms are More Efficient—Even if They Filter
Out
Qualified
Candidates,
BUSINESS
INSIDER,
(Oct.
25,
2013
10:51
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-its-ok-that-employers-filter-out-qualified-candidates-2013-10
[https://perma.cc/7S6Y-373T] (quoting Steve Goodman, CEO of job site Bright.com as stating, “the
Internet has democratized the entire application process. Anybody can go online and spray and pray their
resume all over the place. That’s why it’s actually OK if increasingly complicated algorithms accidentally
filter out some qualified candidates in order to identify the really good ones . . . . People do fall through
the cracks, there’s no question about it. But people don’t fall through the cracks with every job. They fall
through the cracks with one job here, one job there.”)
37. See EEOC, CHARGES FILED, supra note 9.
38. “Older workers and those who seek employment after the age of 65 have historically confronted
intractable institutional and social barriers. . . Negative societal stereotypes about older adults are still
prevalent and most elders report experiencing or witnessing instances of age-based discrimination.”
Jessica Z. Rothenberg & Daniel S. Gardener, Protecting Older Workers: The Failure of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 1 J. Soc. & Soc. Welf. 38, 10 (2011). See also, Judith J.
Johnson, Reasonable Factors other than Age: The Emerging Specter of Ageist Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 49, 53-5 (2009); Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Resusciate the Reasonable Factors Other than Age Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1399, 1399-1401 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination
Really Age Discrimination: The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 782 (1997).
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growing segment of the working-age population in the United States.39 This
trend is expected to continue into the future, as well, with 31 percent of nonretired adults stating that they intend to remain employed until age 68 or
older.40 Additionally, the average age of retirement within the population has
risen to 62, up from 57 when polls were taken in the 1990s.41 Although this
increase in the population of older workers and their later retirement could
explain, in part, why there are more claims of age discrimination than in the
past, this demographic explanation may not account entirely for the drastic
rise in recent claims. In addition to an older worker population, I argue that
online platforms, and the ways in which those platforms are deployed, have
contributed to the rise of age discrimination in employment.
A. Proxies for Age Discrimination in Advertisement Platforms
One mechanism driving the rise in age discrimination claims is that job
advertisement platforms, both in their design and function, allow for the
substitution of age-related proxies in advertising language. The use of ageist
language in job advertisements is not a novel problem. For example, in the
1975 case of Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Services, the Fourth Circuit
ruled that the use of the term “recent graduate” in a job advertisement was
not “merely informational,” but instead deterred older workers from
applying. Thus, such language violated the ADEA.42 In the 1996 case Boyd
v. City of Wilmington, the Eastern District of North Carolina was faced with
a similar question when a plaintiff brought an action against the city of
Wilmington for indicating that “candidates for MPA or MSIR degrees [were]
preferred.”43 The plaintiff, William Boyd, claimed that the language in this
job advertisement, because it referred to newly created degrees, violated the
ADEA’s provision that it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to publish, or
cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to
employment by such an employer . . . indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on age.”44 The Court held, however,
that Boyd had not been able to show “discriminatory intent” and had failed
39.

Id. at 1.
Lydia Saad, Three in 10 U.S. Workers Foresee Working Past Retirement Age, GALLUP NEWS,
(May 13, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/191477/three-workers-foresee-working-past-retirementage.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NF3-AC5G].
41. Rebecca Riffkin, Average U.S. Retirement Age Rises to 62, GALLUP NEWS, (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/168707/average-retirement-age-rises.aspx [https://perma.cc/VTK7-ZNV3];
see Katie Rockwood, Hiring in the Age of Ageism, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT., (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0218/pages/hiring-in-the-age-of-ageism.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4JQ4-UMYB] (explaining that these statistics, which show a steadily increasing average
age of the American worker, can be viewed largely as a result of the financial challenges and employment
gaps that many workers endured during the Great Recession of 2008).
42. Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Serv., Inc., 529 F. 2d 760, 766 (4th Cir. 1975).
43. Boyd v. City of Wilmington, 943 F. Supp. 585, 587, 590-91 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
44. Id. at 590 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1985)).
40.
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to show that the advertisement had “exposed an inclination for the younger
generation or actually resulted in disparate treatment of older workers.”45 In
comparison, today’s job advertisement platforms allow for some
sophistication in how age discrimination might be achieved. While the term
“recent graduate” might be regarded as inarguably ageist, an online ad that
lists a requisite skill set (albeit a new skill set that older graduates might not
have) may more easily escape legal scrutiny while still effectuating an age
discriminatory result.
Technological advancements have allowed ageist job advertisements to
take on even more subtle dimensions. One example is the development of
Facebook Affinity Groups. These groups comprise “socially active”
Facebook users of different demographics which allow advertisers to target
messages.46 With Affinity Groups, clients or advertisers can choose to narrow
or “refine [their] audience,” opting to limit their ads to certain people.47 More
specifically, these Affinity Groups can allow companies to focus their ads on
prospective applicants in specific age bands, such as “ages 18 to 38.”48
While this data often helps business owners to refine their audiences and
advertise to individuals who might be more likely to become customers, this
kind of digital sorting also holds great potential for discrimination. In fact, in
a recent class action suit against Facebook, plaintiffs have alleged that many
large companies engaged in widespread age discrimination in employment
advertising, recruitment processing, and hiring due to their use of these online
affinity groups.49 The plaintiffs’ formal complaint alleges that major
American employers routinely exclude older workers from receiving their
employment and recruiting ads on Facebook, thereby denying older workers
equal opportunity for jobs.50 Additionally, plaintiffs allege that the
companies’ decisions to exclude older workers from seeing their ads were
deliberate, as the companies targeted only younger workers—or left out
Affinity Groups for potential recruits in older age ranges.51
The Communications Workers of America allege that this practice of
“age-based targeting” actively denies job opportunities to potentially
qualified individuals, solely on the basis of age.52 Furthermore, the plaintiffs
argue that online platforms such as Facebook have become the dominant
45.

See id. at 592.
See
U.S.
Hispanic
Affinity
on
Facebook,
FACEBOOK
BUSINESS,
https://www.facebook.com/business/a/us-hispanic-affinity-audience (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
47. Id.
48. Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 11.
49. Amended Complaint ¶ 20, Bradley v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 17-cv-07232-BLF (N.D. Cal.
May 29, 2018), https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com/sites/default/files/documents/og-cwacomplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSM8-UPG9].
50. Complaint, supra note 26, ¶ 11.
51. Id. ¶ 7.
52. Amended Complaint, supra note 49, ¶ 22.
46.
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force for recruiting in the national labor market.53 Thus, by eliminating older
workers from seeing their ad campaigns, companies significantly reduce the
potential job opportunities for these older workers.54 While the use of ageist
language in ads was the primary problem in the past, the targeting capabilities
of platforms now enable employers to ensure that older workers are
effectively screened out of many applicant pools.
B. Proxies for Age Discrimination in Automated Hiring Platforms
Much like how platform technology has transformed ageism in job
advertisements, automated hiring has changed how age discrimination is
effectuated during the hiring process. Automated hiring platforms usually
provide resume screening.55 This feature is extremely appealing for recruiters
who otherwise would spend many hours screening for a single hire.56
However, the value of any time and labor saved must be balanced against the
potential discriminatory impacts on older candidates. Previously, the
discriminatory impacts of automated hiring platforms on older applicants
have largely gone unnoticed. One explanation is that age is not always a
salient variable of job discrimination for employers to consider. In fact, while
64 percent of CEOs report to have solid diversity and inclusion initiatives in
place, a mere 8 percent state that they include age as part of their efforts.57
This lack of interest in curbing age discrimination means that barriers to
inclusion for older workers are often overlooked. One barrier to inclusion is
the redlining of older workers into inferior job positions, such as part-time
jobs. For example, while the job site Indeed.com at one point claimed to have
over 16 million jobs listed worldwide, it was reported that the site also had a
specific category titled “Part Time Jobs, Senior Citizen Jobs.”58 Not only does
this sort of category separate out “senior citizen jobs” from all seemingly
“regular” jobs, which may in itself be discriminatory, it also links “senior
citizen jobs” with “part-time jobs,” likely diminishing the number of hours
that older applicants might be able to work when they do find a job. Another
problem arises from the availability of jobs within the category, which

53. Amended Complaint ¶ 9, Bradley v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 17-cv-07232-BLF (N.D. Cal. May
29, 2018), https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com/sites/default/files/documents/og-cwa-complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NSM8-UPG9].
54. Id. ¶ 10.
55. See Ji-A Min, Three Ways Automation Will Change Recruiting Forever, TALENT CULTURE,
(May 3, 2017), https://talentculture.com/3-ways-recruitment-automation-will-change-recruiting-forever/.
56. See id. (recruiters “spend an average of 23 hours screening resumes for a single hire”).
57. See 18th Annual Global CEO Survey, A Marketplace Without Boundaries?,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INTERNATIONAL,
31
(2015),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceosurvey/2015/assets/pwc-18th-annual-global-ceo-survey-jan-2015.pdf.
58. Bob Sullivan, Online Job Sites May Block Older Workers, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2017),
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contains a mere 158,000 positions of the boasted 16 million total positions.59
At one time, only 0.9% of jobs on Indeed.com were geared specifically
towards older workers, even though these workers make up a much larger
proportion of the working-age population. However, Indeed.com is not alone
in segregating “older applicants” in this manner. Monster.com also has a
special home page for older workers titled “Careers at 50+.”60 Categories like
these act as ageist digital redlining, guiding older applicants to limited jobs
and signaling that only certain age groups should apply.
Other hiring platforms have user interfaces that may be used to cull older
job applicants. For example, some online hiring platforms have drop-down
menus that ask applicants to input their birth dates which are later submitted
with their applications. However, some job applicants have discovered that
these drop-down menus only allow for birth years since 1980 to be
submitted.61 To exacerbate the issue, many platforms will not allow the
applicant to submit the application without an answer to the age question.62
In one case, a 70-year-old Illinois man filed a complaint with the office of
the Illinois Attorney General when he discovered that he was unable to use
an online resume building tool because of built-in age restrictions.63 The
result of the complaint was a request for information by Attorney General
Lisa Madigan to several automated hiring platforms including Monster.com,
Ladders.com, Indeed.com, and several others.64 All of their websites had
varying age cutoffs limiting the age of any applicant.65
C. Proxies for Age Discrimination in Recruitment Platforms
Recruitment platforms are also rife with age-related proxies and ageist
euphemisms, particularly in the manner in which some companies present
their work cultures and open job positions online. This is a problem, for
instance, when companies describe themselves as having a culture comprised
of “digital natives.”66 By using this term to describe corporate culture and by
advertising for “digital natives” or “new grads,”, companies deter older
workers from applying. As the EEOC has previously advised that using

59.
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65. Jaffe, supra note 63.
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phrases like “college student,” “recent college graduate,” and “young blood”
could violate the ADEA,67 some scholars have also argued that the term
“digital native,” implying that the applicant has been exposed to new digital
technologies from an early age, falls in the realm of discriminatory
language.68 It is problematic when corporations use this genre of terms to
define their cultures or conclude that an applicant is a “poor cultural fit”
because the individual is not a “digital native.”69
One prime example is the case of Reid v. Google, in which a California
man sued his former employer, Google, alleging age discrimination under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Law (“FEHA”).70 After only
receiving one performance review from Google during his employment from
June 2002 to February 2004, Reid was described as having “an
extraordinarily broad range of knowledge concerning Operations,
Engineering in general and an aptitude and orientation towards operational
and IT issues.”71 However, Reid’s manager also noted that “[a]dapting to
Google culture is the primary task for the first year. . . [which includes]
[y]ounger contributors, inexperienced first line managers, and the super-fast
pace.”72 At 50 years old, Reid also stated he often felt other employees made
derogatory age-related remarks about his speed at work and the relevance of
his opinions.73 In 2004, Google terminated Reid, allegedly giving him no
rationale other than lack of “cultural fit.”74 Reid then sued Google for age
discrimination and the California Supreme Court ultimately ruled in his
favor, noting that stray remarks may be considered evidence of age
discrimination.75
Reid suggests that it may not be lawful for corporations to indicate that
younger applicants might fit better for a company’s culture when advertising
jobs online. The Society for Human Resource Management goes further,
noting that advertising benefits such as “meals included” could be potentially
discriminatory against older workers, as it seems to presume that the job
applicant should not “have a family waiting for them to come home to
dinner.”76
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Age discrimination is even more of a problem for recruitment platforms
like LinkedIn that request detailed information from job applicants that are
made visible to all potential employers. Notably, the length of experience
could negatively impact older applicants—with lengthier work experience
sections acting as a proxy for age. The notion that employers might
discriminate against an applicant with more experience is also not a new
problem. In one 1980 case, Geller v. Markham, the Second Circuit ruled that
employers could not set limits for how much experience applicants could
have and that the school hiring only teachers with experience below a certain
level was a violation of the ADEA.77 The court also held that the correlation
between age and experience meant that this policy had a disparate impact on
teachers over the age of 40.78
However, the practice of culling applicants for having “too much
experience” has not dissipated since that time. In January 2018, older workers
began the “I, Too, Am Qualified” social media campaign to bring awareness
to this persistent problem.79 Through this campaign, older workers around the
country have begun to share their stories of age discrimination in the
workplace, with the goal of creating change and letting other older workers
know that they are not alone in the discrimination that they encounter. In one
story, Colorado native Scott Croushore recounted looking for work as a
technology consultant.80 As Croushore reached his late 40s, he noticed that it
became more and more difficult to find work.81 As a test, Croushore slashed
13 years of experience off his resume and recruiting profiles.82 To his
surprise, he found work more quickly.83
An additional issue with online recruiting platforms is the use of profile
pictures to evaluate candidates. A paper published in the Journal of Social
Psychological and Personality Science concluded that a person’s first
interpretation of another individual’s profile picture is likely to stick, even
after the two individuals meet in person.84 The paper suggests that this might
be the case because an evaluator’s “photograph-based liking judgment[]” —
snap judgment based on a profile picture — may affect how warmly the two
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behave in person.85 Thus, when it comes to recruiting online, profile photos
on such platforms as LinkedIn become vital information on which applicants
are judged.
Photos take on even more employment significance when we consider
that LinkedIn estimates that “[a]dding a profile photo makes your profile 7x
more likely to be found in searches.”86 Business experts believe that “[n]ot
adding a photo to your LinkedIn profile could raise eyebrows and make
employers wonder what you’re trying to hide.”87 In the online job recruiting
culture, job applicants are thus faced with the Hobson’s choice of being
judged by their profile photos or being viewed negatively if they do not post
a photo.
But, for older applicants, and especially women, judgments of physical
appearance brings the risk of heightened bias.88 Profile photos present
intersectional discrimination for women, as women are more likely to be held
to youthful beauty standards.89 Age discrimination scholar Nicole Porter
argues that because of “society’s biases and prejudices about the way women
are supposed to look,” older women are disproportionately discriminated
against in employment particularly due to their appearance.90 For older
workers, the extensive past experiences they detail on these platforms, as well
as their no longer youthful photos, may serve as proxies that allow for age
discrimination on recruitment platforms.
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In an effort to curb discrimination in employment, the AARP has created
a pledge for employers to affirm that they “believe that 50+ workers should
have a level playing field in their ability to compete for and obtain jobs” and
agree to “recruit across diverse age groups and consider all applicants on an
equal basis.”91 However, while some employers are taking these pledges and
joining movements to end age discrimination, the existence of platforms as
algorithmic intermediaries, means we must consider how and when the law
should intervene.
II. THE ADEA VERSUS PLATFORMS
Given the increased use of platforms in the recruitment and hiring
process and their demonstrated ability to enable ageism, it seems then that
there is no question as to whether the ADEA applies to platforms, but other
laws such as the Communication Decency Act (the CDA) must be taken into
account. It is unclear whether the ADEA is robust enough to address the
amplified and sophisticated means to age discrimination afforded by
platforms. Some courts have also begun to question whether online platforms
occupy more than just the neutral role of a publisher or editor if they are
effectively controlling the content that appears on their sites and the
audiences who see it. In the subsections below, I discuss: 1) whether the
ADEA applies to platforms; 2) the difficulties of proof in alleging age
discrimination in relation to platforms (given that platforms enable the use of
facially neutral proxies); and 3) whether there should be heightened
responsibilities assigned to certain types of platforms that traffic in sensitive
personal information.
A. Does the ADEA Apply to Platforms?
When it comes to age discrimination enabled by platforms, a key
threshold question is whether the ADEA applies. The ADEA does apply
when the platform is actively shaping the information transmitted to a third
party. Consider that in 2016, a complaint in the Eastern District of New York
accused Facebook of aiding terrorist attacks.92 The plaintiffs in Cohen v.
Facebook argued that Facebook’s machine-learning algorithm, which
provides more visibility for stories that are receiving heightened media
attention, aided the terrorist attacks through higher visibility and made
Facebook complicit in the eventual harm.93

91. AARP
Employer
Pledge,
AARP
(2018),
https://volunteers.aarp.org/employer-pledge-form/default.aspx; Employer Pledge Program, AARP
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92. Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 146-47 (2017).
93. Id.
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Yet, under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)94,
interactive service providers such as Facebook cannot be held liable for usergenerated content where the provider did not create or develop the content at
issue.95 Section 230 also protects publishers and editors from the content they
publish, holding that the posted content is the responsibility of the content
creator alone. However, this case touched on a potential exemption of Section
230, arguing that Facebook’s machine-learning algorithm has the power to
personalize what content is shown by selecting which stories to display over
others.96 In her article, Wild Westworld: The Application of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act to Social Networks’ Use of Machine Learning
Algorithms, Professor Catherine Tremble argues that machine-learning
algorithms that personalize content, such as Facebook’s, do not qualify for
Section 230 immunity because they effectively become co-developers of the
content by choosing what content is displayed and when.97
The court in Cohen v. Facebook dismissed Cohen’s complaints, holding
that Cohen failed to point to any direct injury to herself that was not also
faced by the general public from Facebook’s algorithms.98 But other courts
have found that platforms can be liable for discrimination when more
personal information is required. For example, in a 2008 case, Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit held
that the CDA did not immunize the Fair Housing Council from liability
arising from preferential questions used in housing surveys.99 In that case,
plaintiffs took issue with Roommates.com requiring users to disclose
personal information, including their sex, sexual orientations, and whether or
not they had children.100 The court held that Roommates.com was not merely
a provider of an interactive service, but had direct control over the content
that they showed to other users.101 Under the CDA, then, Roommates.com
was not only publishing information, but was helping to develop unlawful
content.102
Following the same logic, courts have recently begun to question
whether the ADEA can also apply to online hiring platforms. At the root of
this question is whether online hiring platforms are manipulating content
such that they might be considered content developers under Section 230 the
CDA. In Cramblett v. McHugh in 2014, the plaintiff argued he was not hired
94.
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Catherine Tremble, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social Networks’ Use of
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due to age discrimination and that a computerized algorithm had been used
to weed out resumes with “insufficient qualifications,” which included
candidates’ skills and past employment history.103 Cramblett argued that his
age was a “substantial factor” taken into consideration by the algorithm that
culled his application.104 The Ninth Circuit held, however, following the “but
for” causation rule under Gross v. FBL Financial Services,105 that Cramblett’s
showing that his age was a “substantial factor” was not enough to meet the
standard of proof for age discrimination.106 Instead, to make his claim of age
discrimination, Cramblett was required to show that “but for” his age, he
would have been hired.107
While Cramblett failed to meet this burden, his contention that he was
culled by an algorithm as a consequence of his age could indicate a growing
issue for employers as it relates to ADEA protections for job applicants.
Cramblett’s claim, and others like it, may be bolstered in the future by stricter
data documentation that could show age was a “but for” cause for the hiring
decision.
B. “But For” - Difficulties of Proof Under the ADEA
As Cramblett’s case implies, even in the event that the ADEA is found
to apply to platforms, plaintiffs still must meet the higher “but for” standard
of proof. This is because the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the
standard which plaintiffs must meet when filing complaints under the ADEA
in order to show age discrimination. The case, Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, held that a plaintiff needed to prove, “by a preponderance of the
evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse
employment action.”108 Gross drastically raised the standard of proof for
ADEA age discrimination claims from the previous “motivating factor”
standard.109 Thus Gross has made it much more difficult for plaintiffs to
prove ADEA cases.110
Melissa Hart has noted that the Supreme Court’s majority ruling in
Gross overruled a twenty-year precedent to the detriment of labor and
employment law plaintiffs.111 Furthermore, Hart writes that the Court’s
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“casual, one-paragraph redefinition of what it means for an action to be taken
‘because of’ a protected characteristic may well have consequences beyond
the age discrimination context,”112 as the decision moves claims under the
ADEA away from the Title VII standard of establishing discrimination
(which can be proven by establishing a protected characteristic was a
“motivating factor” in the adverse employment action).113
Further, Hart shows that, because of this movement away from the Title
VII standard, Gross calls into question the ability of ADEA plaintiffs to make
mixed-motive claims.114 Mixed-motive claims are those in which plaintiffs
argue that a protected characteristic was a motivating or substantial factor in
an adverse employment action, even if other motivating factors used could
have been lawful.115 Since Gross held that discrimination claims under the
ADEA must show that the action would not have occurred “but-for” the
consideration of the plaintiff’s age, making mixed-motive claims under the
ADEA has become significantly more difficult, if not impossible.116
Ultimately, this means that significantly fewer cases of age discrimination
can be proven under the ADEA, because many employers might have used
lawful considerations in addition to a plaintiff’s age when making
employment decisions.
Courts have also begun to defer to employers to show that they
addressed “reasonable factors other than age” in their contested employment
decisions. For example, in the 2016 case Villarreal v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco,
plaintiff Richard Villarreal applied for a territory sales manager job at
Reynolds Tobacco via an online platform.117 He was 49 years old at the time
he sent his application. After applying, Villarreal was never contacted, and
he did not follow up with Reynolds.118 However, several years later, he
learned that the company’s internal hiring guidelines described “targeted
candidates” as those “2-3 years out of college” and that reviewers should
“stay away from” applicants whose resumes showed that they had been “in
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sales for 8-10 years.”119 After hearing about these internal guidelines,
Villarreal filed suit alleging a violation of the ADEA.120
In Villarreal, the majority effectively stated that, although Reynolds
Tobacco had used discriminatory guidelines internally, Mr. Villarreal could
not prove age discrimination because he did not diligently follow up
regarding his application decision.121 Thus, the employment decision could
have been made based on a number of factors other than Villarreal’s age. 122
The Villarreal decision indicates the court’s deference to the employer to
show that a decision was made for “reasonable factors other than age.” 123
Reynolds did not have to show its decision was not discriminatory, but
simply had to show that its decision could have been for other factors related
to Villarreal’s application.124 Effectively, by linking Gross, in which
plaintiffs must show age was the “but-for” factor in an adverse employment
decision,125 and Villarreal, in which employers must simply show age was
not the only factor in their decisions,126 courts have made it very difficult for
plaintiffs to prove ADEA violations.
Thus, courts’ changes in ADEA standards have done nothing to mitigate
existing factors127 that have made proving ADEA claims exceedingly
difficult. For example, recently terminated workers of Spirit AeroSystems
have found their age discrimination claims very difficult to prove because
“[e]ven companies that decide that older workers are too expensive, with
their larger paychecks and costlier health insurance, rarely detail this in
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internal documents or emails.”128 Additional issues with proving ADEA
claims include the costs of the lawsuits and the time it takes to try them.129
C. The Responsibility of Platforms as Information Fiduciaries
An additional theory that could hold platforms liable for age
discrimination positions their creators as information fiduciaries who can be
held liable for age discrimination on their platforms. In his article,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, Jack Balkin defines
information fiduciaries as entities “who, because of their relationship with
another, [assume] special duties with respect to the information they obtain
in the course of the relationship.”130 He compares these online companies to
traditional fiduciaries, like doctors and lawyers, who have the duty not to
disclose sensitive information about their clients.131 Balkin primarily believes
that this relationship is necessary because these service providers rely on the
trust of their clients, and are thus theoretically deterred from misusing the
information that they obtain.132 However, online information fiduciaries have
a much wider scope than traditional fiduciaries due to the reach of the
internet. By way of online platforms, these fiduciary relationships are
widespread, and include companies that are “increasingly using sophisticated
algorithms and forms of artificial intelligence to make decisions about people
in areas ranging from advertising to employment to policing to credit.”133
Considered in the context of employment, one primary question has
arisen: where do the responsibilities of these fiduciaries lie with regard to the
information they receive? More specifically, does the information fiduciary
hold any responsibility for creating categories of information or designing its
platform in such a way as to capture categories of information, some of which
may be considered protected information? Some legal scholars have noted
that platforms, which might be considered information fiduciaries because of
the amount and type of information they collect from potential job applicants,
“can control who is matched with whom for various forms of exchange, what
information users have about one another during their interactions, and how
indicators of reliability and reputation are made salient.”134
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Here, following Professor Balkin’s analogy from above,135 it might be
helpful to draw a comparison between the relationship of online hiring
platforms and their users to the relationship that patients have with both
doctors and nurses. The role of the online hiring platform might be compared
to that of a nurse, who goes through records and conducts a preliminary
check-up, determining what the cause of a patient’s sickness might be before
bringing in a doctor. Then, the information is passed to a doctor, or the
employer in this analogy, to conduct a more in-depth review of the patient’s
condition. This is the function that an online hiring platform might fulfill
before passing on information to a hiring manager. In both situations, parties
retain sensitive information internally, for their own use. Thus, one might
argue that, like an information fiduciary, an online hiring platform has an
obligation to act in the interests of its clients.136
As other scholars have noted, these platforms “necessarily exercise a
great deal of control over how users’ encounters are structured.”137 In
evaluating certain design policy choices made by platform creators, such as
what information might be requested or how the platform is structured to
allow certain types of information and not others, it becomes clear that
platforms shape the amount of information their users can learn about one
another and how they are to do so.138 Harkening back to the example of
limited dates on drop down birthdate data fields described above,139 a given
platform’s design choices can exacerbate age discrimination. Thus, some
argue, platforms should not be held completely blameless for discrimination,
even if their users may be influenced by pre-existing biases.140 Rather, the
law should recognize platform authoritarianism as a socio-technical
phenomenon that changes both the responsibility and liability of platforms.
Scholars have challenged the “dominant position in the legal literature
that [increased] transparency will solve [the] problem” of algorithmic bias.141
While the scholars recognize that “the accountability mechanisms and legal
standards that govern [algorithmic decisions] have not kept pace with
technology,” they believe that the only way to fix the issues with technology
is by deploying further technological solutions.142 One suggestion for
preventing discrimination in hiring is to create a method whereby technology
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can show that a particular algorithm “does not directly use sensitive or
prohibited classes of information.”143
In response, Professor Pauline Kim argues that technical “checks” on
the decision process like randomization or predefining constraints cannot
solve the entire problem at hand.144 Instead, Professor Kim argues that
“causes of bias often lie not in the code, but in broader social processes.”145
The true issue is classification bias, which requires outside scrutiny. For
example, third parties could examine computer code or the decision criteria
it implements to detect biases.146
Although elsewhere I have also argued for third party audits similar to
those envisioned by Professor Pauline Kim,147 I also believe that the
responsibility to prevent algorithmic bias and disparate impacts rests on both
the employer and platform creator. Indeed, there are many checks that both
parties might take to ensure equal opportunity for all workers in the future,
such as ending the separation of job categories by age, checking for the use
of age-related proxies in job advertisement and by platforms, and subjecting
employment data to external audits.
The controversy over whether to hold platform creators responsible for
the discrimination that occurs on their sites involves the question of how
much control these online hiring platforms exercise over the type of
information to be collected and how that information is used. In some cases,
it seems the platforms themselves may not have much control over what
information they intake and the criteria imposed by employers in searching
for applicants.148 Professor Kim writes that one of the major problems in
relying on the conviction of these hiring platforms is “classification bias,”
essentially that the information they receive is either biased to begin with or
is ordered by a third party to be classified into prohibited characteristics such
as race or sex.149 In such a scenario, this might be the reason to make an
argument against assigning liability for discriminatory outcomes to the
platform as an information fiduciary if the platform only takes an
administrative role in sorting through applications based on an employer’s
preferences.
Thus, the liability of platforms hinges on the amount of control they
exact over determining what sensitive information to collect or over how to
classify candidates. As in Fair Housing Council where the court held
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Roomates.com could be considered a content creator rather than merely a
publisher, the ADEA should be extended to automated hiring platforms,
when, as detailed previously, they actively shape the content that users see,
and such content is specifically the type of content that might be used for age
discrimination in employment.150
III. SOME PROPOSALS FOR TACKLING AGE DISCRIMINATION BY
PLATFORMS
In this section, I offer three proposals for curbing platform-enabled age
discrimination in employment. First, because of the difficulty of proving
disparate treatment, which typically would require hard evidence of an
individual targeted for age discrimination, advocates should attempt to
reinforce the disparate impact cause of action for the ADEA via codification.
Second, given the issues of ageist language on online hiring platforms, such
as the use of terms like “digital natives,” the EEOC should provide
educational guidelines for employers regarding the use of ageist language or
other age proxies in job ads. Finally, with an aim to facilitate disparate impact
claims aimed at curbing age discrimination, the EEOC should consider
implementing guidelines for the documentation of criteria used to determine
suitable applicants and for more stringent data retention on job
advertisement, recruitment, and hiring platforms.
A. Strengthen the ADEA by Codifying the Disparate Impact Cause of Action
Strengthening the ADEA with a disparate impact cause of action could
help stem age discrimination in employment via platforms. Several legal
scholars have analyzed how the frameworks courts use to evaluate
discrimination claims impact their success.151 The lack of a codified disparate
impact cause of action is an impediment to plaintiffs seeking redress for
platform-enabled age discrimination. The codification of a disparate impact
cause of action would provide another avenue of proof for plaintiffs. For one,
in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Circuit
was incorrect “to hold that the disparate impact theory of liability was

150.

See supra Part I.A-C.
See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011);
William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master Builder
Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683 (2010); William R. Corbett,
Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81 (2009); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 857 (2010); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks,
93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995); Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313 (2010); Charles
A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911
(2005); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell
Douglas?, 53 EMORY L. J. 1887 (2004); Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate
Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001).
151.

24

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 40:1

categorically unavailable under the ADEA.152 While courts have concluded
that, even in the absence of statutory language, the ADEA does allow for
disparate impact claims, codification would provide greater protection to
workers and job applicants.
Legal scholars have written about arguments for and against adding a
disparate impact clause into the ADEA. For example, Professor Henry
Pfutzenreuter noted that “given the textual similarities between Title VII and
the ADEA, courts [could apply] the same standards to both acts.”153 In fact,
in the Smith decision, Justice Stevens identified that the two were almost
completely identical in their text and structure.154 However, because not all
courts agree on the availability of implicit ADEA relief under a disparate
impact theory for victims of age discrimination, some legal scholars have
argued that the risk of the theory’s obsolescence for the ADEA is high.155
Professor Pfutzenreuter proposes a balancing approach between a
Reasonable Factor Other than Age (RFOA) defense and a disparate impact
defense.156 Arguing that the minimal threshold for finding a RFOA is too low,
Professor Pfutzenreuter suggests courts should instead try to balance the
“reasonableness” of an employer’s reliance on a factor other than age and
then consider discrimination at an implicit level.157 Overall, he concludes that
a solution is needed to fix the current inability of plaintiffs to find
discriminatory impact relief under the ADEA.
Following the same logic, Professor Michael Harper argues that the
ADEA should be amended to provide the same procedural strengths that Title
VII provides.158 Harper’s reasoning arises from “the obvious relative
weakness of the nation’s regulation of age discrimination in employment”
and the lack of effort of the then-Obama administration to combat the
confusion surrounding the issue of disparate impact arising from recent court
decisions.159 Further, Harper observes that “the continuing gap between the
ADEA and Title VII may reflect assumptions that age discrimination is less
likely to be malignly motivated” than the other protected classes–a statement
which he suggests may be true.160 However, Harper notes that the motivation
does not make age discrimination in employment any less serious than the
forms of discrimination proscribed by Title VII.161 Following this reasoning,
152.
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Harper calls for damage remedies, class actions, defenses to disparate impact
actions, and causation standards for disparate treatment actions under the
ADEA, in line with the protections granted by Title VII.162
Professor Judith Johnson argues that because employers are more
frequently using age-correlated criteria to make employment decisions that
are “opportunistic” for their bottom lines, a solution is necessary to combat
“exactly [the age discrimination that] the ADEA was designed to prevent.”163
To alleviate this issue, Professor Johnson proposes a two-stage solution
“apply[ing] the disparate impact theory to the ADEA, which would require
an employer to justify the use of an age-correlated factor that would have a
disparate impact on older workers.”164 To do so, Professor Johnson proposes
that the employer should be required to bear the burden of persuasion that the
use of any age-correlated factor that selects out older workers, such as high
salary, is justified as a “reasonable factor other than age.”165 This solution
would effectively make it more difficult for courts to simply defer to
employers who might point to an RFOA explanation without legitimate proof
that the qualification is “reasonable.”
Professor Sandra Sperino notably criticizes the idea of liability for
discrimination arising from separate frameworks, questioning whether courts
should even “use frameworks to conceptualize discrimination in the first
place.”166 Her central argument revolves around the idea that “faulty sorting
contributes to stereotyping and societal discrimination” and that by sorting
cases into frameworks, courts themselves are operating by the same
discriminatory principles that are questioned in the cases they are trying to
solve.167 Professor Sperino does not suggest a return to traditional claims of
discriminatory impact, but instead relies on a simpler solution whereby courts
carefully follow elements of proof for any discrimination case as defined by
the key statutory language in the antidiscrimination statute.168
I argue that the ADEA would be more effective with a disparate cause
of action and its procedures written into the statute. Such codification would
162.
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standardize the use of a disparate impact theory of action for age
discrimination cases, thus alleviating confusion as to how the disparate
impact theory would be applied and also encouraging would-be plaintiffs to
file claims under the disparate impact theory. As some scholars have noted,
the language of the ADEA is in parallel with that of the Title VII, which does
have a codified disparate impact cause of action.169 One could argue then that
the similarity between the two statutes means the omission of the disparate
impact cause of action was deliberate.170 But, I argue the omission was merely
an oversight that should be remedied, particularly in light of recent decisions
like Smith that have come out in favor of a disparate impact cause of action
for the ADEA.
B. EEOC Education For Employers Regarding Ageist Language In Job
Advertisements
Another proposal to curb age discrimination caused by online platforms
is the release of EEOC guidelines to educate employers on ageist language
in job advertisements. A search of the EEOC website reveals no such existing
guidelines.171 As previously described, job advertisements on platforms are
rife with descriptions such as “digital native” or “recent graduate.”172 A
generous interpretation of this phenomenon is that employers truly may not
understand how such language might dissuade older job applicants. Whether
or not this is the case, EEOC guidelines that clarify what might be classified
as ageist language in advertisements and resume screening would help
employers and plaintiffs seeking to bring suit when they suspect the
occurrence of age discrimination on platforms.
C. EEOC Guidelines for Design of Hiring Platforms and Their Data
Collection Practices
An EEOC-led effort to combat age discrimination enabled by work
platforms should include evidence-backed guidelines for the design of hiring
platforms. These design guidelines would, for example, address user
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interfaces that are more difficult for older workers to use, such as those with
small print or drop-down menus for birthdates or graduation years, for
example, that exclude options for older applicants.173 I would also propose
that the EEOC set forth guidelines for data collection practices by platforms
that instruct them to prohibit data collection that can be used as proxies
against older workers.
CONCLUSION
Age discrimination is not merely a matter of the violation of established
law; rather, it is a societal issue that goes to the very survival of elderly
people. Consider that on the island of Keos in the Aegean Sea, when the
island was besieged and its residents were slowly being starved by the
Athenians, the island residents responded by voting that those over sixty
years old must commit suicide by drinking hemlock.174 And according to
Greek mythology, on the island of Sardinia, sons slew their elderly fathers,
as human sacrifices to the god of time, Cronus.175 A rule of law that respects
the worth of geriatric human life, coupled with technological advances in
healthcare mean that humans now live much longer than before. Thus,
excluding older workers from gainful employment is akin to the senicide act
of sending them into the open sea on a raft with no provisions. Age
discrimination on job seeking platforms is increasingly well documented,
particularly in regards to design elements and functionality that redline, cull,
or dissuade older job applicants. To preserve equal opportunity for
employment, the law must attend to the new avenues for age discrimination
now presented by the technological capabilities of platforms. The three-part
proposal I have set forth will help to combat age discrimination in the face of
platform authoritarianism.
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